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(6 reviews)
Author: Martin C. Libicki
ISBN : 0833047345
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Format: PDF
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Cyberspace, where information—and hence serious value—is stored and manipulated, is a tempting target. An attacker could be a person, group, or state and may disrupt or corrupt the systems from which cyberspace is built. When states are involved, it is tempting to compare fights to warfare, but there are important differences. The author addresses these differences and ways the United States protect itself in the face of attack.
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- Paperback: 238 pages
- Publisher: RAND Corporation (October 5, 2009)
- Language: English
- ISBN-10: 0833047345
- ISBN-13: 978-0833047342
- Product Dimensions: 0.6 x 6.4 x 9 inches
- Shipping Weight: 14.1 ounces (View shipping rates and policies)
Free Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar
As background, I am a former Air Force captain who led the intrusion detection operation in the AFCERT before applying those same skills to private industry, the government, and other sectors. I am currently responsible for detection and response at a Fortune 5 company and I train others with hands-on labs as a Black Hat instructor. I also earned a master's degree in public policy from Harvard after graduating from the Air Force Academy.
Martin Libicki's Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar (CAC) is a weighty discussion of the policy considerations of digital defense and attack. He is clearly conversant in non-cyber national security history and policy, and that knowledge is likely to benefit readers unfamiliar with Cold War era concepts. Unfortunately, Libicki's lack of operational security experience undermines his argument and conclusions. The danger for Air Force leaders and those interested in policy is that they will not recognize that, in many cases, Libicki does not understand what he is discussing. I will apply lessons from direct experience with digital security to argue that Libicki's framing of the "cyberdeterrence" problem is misguided at best and dangerous at worst.
Libicki's argument suffers five key flaws. First, in the Summary Libicki states "cyberattacks are possible only because systems have flaws" (p xiii). He continues with "there is, in the end, no forced entry in cyberspace... It is only a modest exaggeration to say that organizations are vulnerable to cyberattack only to the extent they want to be. In no other domain of warfare can such a statement be made" (p. xiv). I suppose, then, that there is "no forced entry" when a soldier destroys a door with a rocket, because the owners of the building are vulnerable "to the extent they want to be"?